Introduction
Making the public sector more efficient is one of the most formidable challenges faced by policymakers all over the world. In the case of developing countries, the significance of this challenge is revealed by the sectoral distribution of World Bank credits and loans. 1 In the fiscal year 2000, public sector reform was the most important sector of lending, amounting to almost 1.9 billion dollars, out of a total of roughly 15.3 billion. Lending for public sector reform exceeded the combined lending for education and the environment.
It also exceeded the combined lending for water supply, sanitation, population, nutrition and health programs. And it was bigger than lending for social protection, which was at one of its highest levels in World Bank history. The only sector that came close to public sector reform was finance. But this is hardly surprising in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, when many commercial banks still needed to be re-capitalized.
As the wage bill is the largest item in public sector spending, reforming the public sector usually entails changes in employment and pay. This is a socially and politically charged issue. Public sector workers are among the most vocal and influential interest groups in any society. Policy measures that affect them adversely are often met by strong resistance, derailing reform programs and causing governments to fall. Typically, public sector workers claim that they are underpaid compared to their private sector counterparts, argue that low pay is at the root of inefficiency and corruption, and try to reorient public sector reform in the direction of pay raises. That specific groups of public sector workers (especially at the professional and managerial levels) may be underpaid is not questioned. However, the very fact that most public sector workers are unwilling to leave their jobs, except in exchange for generous compensation, suggests that overpayment is also common.
The absence of reliable information on the gap between public and private sector pay may increase the leverage of interest groups to influence government decisions regarding public sector pay. This lack of information is also a hindrance when designing downsizing programs. Compensation packages for redundant workers tend to be set up in ad hoc ways. Typically, some rule of thumb involving salary and seniority in the public sector is used, but the resulting amount of compensation bears no relationship with the present value of the loss in earnings and benefits from job separation. While many separated workers have been under-compensated, some of the separation packages used in developing countries could easily qualify as "golden handshakes" (Kikeri, 1997) .
Downsizing programs supported by the World Bank are not an exception in this respect (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999) .
Unfortunately, the method that is most frequently used to estimate the gap between public and private sector pay is bound to produce biased results in developing countries. This method, called "the jobs approach" in what follows, focuses on the salaries of a set of private sector jobs whose description is similar to that of public sector jobs. A usual version of the jobs approach is the "Hays points" system used by many large organizations (including, until quite recently, the World Bank itself) to set their compensation levels. The problem when applying this approach to developing countries is that comparable jobs are mainly or exclusively found in formal sector enterprises. Jobs of this sort might be the relevant alternative for public sector workers at the professional and managerial levels. However, tracer studies of separated public sector workers suggest that the relevant alternative for the rank-and-file is self-employment, or casual work in informal activities, including agriculture (Alderman et al., 1996, Rama and MacIsaac, 1999) . As salaried jobs in formal sector enterprises are among the best in a developing country, the jobs approach overestimates the extent to which public sector workers are underpaid, or underestimates the extent to which they are overpaid. Despite its obvious bias, this approach is often used in World Bank-supported reform programs.
The alternative is to compare the earnings of public sector workers to those of similar workers in the private sector, regardless of whether they are employed in the formal or the informal sector of the economy. This method is called "the workers
approach" in what follows. One potential problem with the workers approach is that individuals may be similar along some observable dimensions (e.g., gender, age or educational attainment) but different in more subtle ways. For instance, public sector workers could be more talented, or less ambitious, or better connected, than their private sector counterparts. Comparing the earnings of a public sector worker to those of an apparently similar private sector worker may thus be misleading. What needs to be evaluated is the earnings a public sector worker would have if he or she were to move to the private sector, taking into account his or her talent, ambition or connections. But those earnings are unobservable. By ignoring relevant unobservable characteristics, the workers approach could therefore lead to results that are as biased as those obtained with the jobs approach, except that the direction of the bias is unknown a priori.
The goal of this paper is to assess whether the bias created by unobservable individual characteristics, also known as selection bias, is substantial enough to invalidate the workers approach. For this assessment to be credible, it has to focus on a country that satisfies two criteria. First, its database has to be good enough to credibly measure the gap in earnings and benefits between the public and the private sector, "corrected" for the effect of unobservable individual characteristics. The availability of a nationally representative household survey with a panel structure over time is the ideal in this respect. Second, there has to be a strong presumption that recruitment into the public sector, and separation from it, is influenced by unobservable individual characteristics that influence priva te sector earnings. If, say, recruitment were strictly based on educational attainment, it would not be surprising to find that the selection bias is negligible. But this finding would be irrelevant for other, less meritocratic countries.
Vietnam meets these two criteria. As regards the public sector, it was government policy to use jobs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as an income transfer. In principle, some of these jobs were to be considered as a reward for political loyalty or a compensation for sacrifices incurred during independence wars. In practice, many of them were allocated based on connections. Presumably, those who got the jobs would have had lower earnings in the private sector. But political loyalty, war-related losses or connections are not measurable. More recently, SOEs were subject to a massive downsizing program that led to the separation of roughly one third of their workforce in the early 1990s, partly on a voluntary basis. Those who remained were probably less entrepreneurial, and had worse earnings opportunities in the private sector. Again, the entrepreneurial spirit is not measurable. Because of the role played by unobservable characteristics in both recruitment and separations, the selection bias could be considerable when estimating the potential earnings of SOE workers in the private sector.
Concerning the data, Vietnam has a high-quality, nationally representative survey with a panel structure, known as the VLSS (for Vietnam Living Standards Survey). The VLSS reports detailed information on sector of employment and earnings, including a vast array of benefits and payments in kind, for a large sample of workers. It was carried out in 1992-1993 and in 1997-1998 , and a substantial fraction of the workers was interviewed in both rounds. Because the public sector of Vietnam stills employ a nonnegligible portion of the labor force, in each of the two rounds of the VLSS it is possible to find hundreds of workers whose main occupation is in an SOE. The panel nature of the VLSS also makes it possible to "remove" the effect of unobservable characteristics, by focusing on the change in earnings experienced by individuals who moved from SOEs to the private sector, or vice-versa. But panel data analysis is only one among several econometric techniques that can be applied to VLSS data to correct for the effects of selection bias.
Our paper is certainly not the first one to use the workers approach, or to explicitly assess the impact of selection bias on the earnings gap between the public and the private sectors in a developing country. To our knowledge, studies along similar lines exist for Côte d'Ivoire (van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988) , Ethiopia (Mengistae, 1998) ,
Haiti (Terrell, 1993) , India (Lakshmanasamy and Ramasamy, 1999) , Indonesia (Filmer and Lindauer, 2001) , Peru (Stelcner et al., 1989) , Poland (Adamchik and Beri, 2000) , Taiwan (Hou, 1993) and Tanzania (Lindauer and Sabot, 1983) . Another study uses the workers approach to estimate the earnings gap for a specific group of public sector workers, namely teachers, across a dozen Latin American countries (Psacharopoulos et al., 1996) .
However, our paper differs from previous studies in several, important ways.
First, it focuses on the entire distribution of the earnings gap, and not only on its "average" size. Second, rather than choosing one method to correct for the selection bias, it relies on a broad array of empirical strategies. A valid criticism of all the methods used to correct for the effect of unobservable individual characteristics is that they require strong assumptions. By comparing the results obtained with alternative methods, hence under alternative assumptions, this paper implicitly evaluates the robustness of the estimated distribution of earnings gaps. Third, the paper also compares the results obtained with the workers approach to those obtained with the jobs approach. This comparison reveals how misleading the latter can be.
State -Owned Enterprises in Vietnam
Although the public sector of Vietnam is not large compared to other transition countries, it still plays a significant role in the economy. SOEs employ roughly five percent of the labor force, but account for around a fifth of GDP. This higher productivity is the result of a much higher capital intensity of produc tion, which in turn may require the use of relatively more qualified workers. Technology is only one among many reasons why SOE workers differ from private sector workers. SOE workers are older on average than private sector workers, as the public sector expanded in the times of central planning, but has been shrinking since market-oriented reforms (or Doi Moi) began, in the late 1980s. As Vietnam is a young country, most of the new entrants to the labor force end up in the private sector. In a country that is still massively rural, SOE workers are also more urban. And SOE workers are predominantly male, despite the fact that labor force participation rates are similar for men and women in Vietnam. This male bias exists not just compared to the private sector in general, but also compared to formal enterprises in the private sector (MOLISA, 1998).
Public sector workers differ from private sector workers in more subtle ways too.
In Vietnam, it has been an explicit government policy to use SOE jobs as an income transfer. Shortly after the French war, it was decided that "people to be recruited must be from all sectors: northern, southern, female, male, with priority on recruiting people who had been active or had achievements in the war and are working to build peace" (circular 8/LD-TT of August 1959; our translation). While skill levels were deemed important, the required standards included "political quality, workers disposition [and] health", all characteristics that might be difficult to measure using a household survey instrument. volunteer" (our translation). Admittedly, the share of female workers who lost their jobs was disproportionately high, and this could be an indication that many separations were involuntary (Rama, 2001) . However, the downsizing program of the early 1990s would be a potential source of selection bias as long as some of the separations were voluntary, and many of them were.
Despite this massive downsizing, SOEs remain substantially over-staffed in
Vietnam. An analysis based on plant-level data suggests that as many as half of the workers would be redundant if SOEs were to operate in the same way as fully private enterprises (Belser and Rama, 2001 Still, the kind of pay study that would be carried out in the context of a public sector reform program would probably be quite similar to the one commissioned by the UNDP.
The matching of occupations across the VLSS survey and the UNDP study is probably not perfect. Several jobs had to be discarded, either because they were not similar enough or because they included very few observations. Still, the picture that emerges from Table 1 would not be substantially different under different matching hypotheses.
According to Table 1 , SOE workers are clearly underpaid. If the figures in this table are to be taken literally, an office worker would earn more than twice as much in the formal private sector, and five to six times as much with the "best" employers in
Vietnam. The gaps vary from occupation to occupation, but the basic conclusion holds. If SOE wages were to be revised based on the jobs approach, the obvious recommendation would be to raise them substantially. However, the difference in the size of the recommended wage increase, depending on which comparator is used, casts doubts on the reliability of this approach. If resources were not a constraint, should the wages of office workers in SOEs be multiplied by a factor of two, or by a factor of six? In fact, the workers approach suggests that both figures are wrong. But its implementation requires some explanation.
The Workers Approach
As a first approximation, the gap between the salary in the SOE and the alternative labor earnings in the private sector can be estimated using a very simple econometric model. Let X i be a vector representing the observable characteristics of worker 'i' (e.g., gender, educational attainment, work experience, etc.) and W i be the labor earnings of this worker. The sector of employment can be captured by the indicator variable S i , which is equal to one if worker 'i' is employed by an SOE and equal to zero if he or she is in the private sector. The following relationship between individual characteristics and labor earnings can be assumed for those who work in the private sector:
where e i is a stochastic disturbance with zero mean. This disturbance summarizes the effects of unobservable individual characteristics, such as talent, political loyalty, warrelated losses, or connections. Assuming that e i is not correlated with the unobservable individual characteristics X i , the parameters in vector a X can be estimated by ordinary least squares.
The estimated parame ters, identified in what follows by a hat, can in turn be used to predict the earnings an SOE worker with individual characteristics X i would have in the private sector. More specifically, the gap between actual earnings in the SOE sector and predicted earnings in the private sector can be defined as:
The gap in equation (2) is identified by the number one to indicate that it is estimated with the first (and simplest) econometric model considered in this paper. For relatively small values of this gap, R1 can be interpreted as a percentage.
The model just described generates biased results when labor earnings are affected by unobservable individual characteristics that are correlated with the sector of employment. The switching regression model is one among several empirical strategies to deal with this problem. This model assumes that the sector of employment is determined as follows:
In equation (3), Z i are individual characteristics that affect the latent variable S* i , hence potentially the sector of employment, but not the level of earnings.
The model is completed by two earnings equations, one for each sector:
The disturbances ? The estimated parameters can be used to predict the earnings public sector workers would have in the private sector, taking into account both their observable and unobservable characteristics. The prediction involves the density function ( ) . φ and the accumulated density function ( )
. Let i φ and i Φ be those values. The predicted gap in earnings can be written as:
The interpretation of equation (5) is not straightforward. Consider again the case where the relevant unobservable characteristic is political motivation, and the correlation coefficient 0 ρ is negative. Consider also two SOE workers: one who was recruited mainly because he or she had the right skills (education, experience, etc.) and one that was recruited based on political considerations. The first, skilled worker, is characterized by a high value of the latent variable S* and a high value of the ratio ( )
. For the second, politically motivated worker, the ratio ( )
is small. Because 0 ρ is negative (and 0 σ is positive), the last term in equation (5) is larger for the politically motivated worker than for the skilled worker. Put differently, based on their unobservable characteristics only, the politically motivated worker loses more if he or she has to move to the private sector.
The next two models considered in this paper involve the use of panel data. Their key assumption is that the effect of the relevant unobservable characteristics on earnings can be found at least twice in the data. In the simplest case, the same individual is observed at two points in time. The labor earnings of this individual can be seen as the outcome of three different determinants: his or her observable individual characteristics, the sector he or she works in, and his or her unobservable characteristics. The effect of the latter, hereafter called i ν , is supposed to be invariant over time and across sectors.
The resulting earnings equation is:
where the sub-index t indicates a point in time. Assume, for instance, that a more talented individual earns more in both sectors. In that case, i ν would be positive.
The availability of at least two observations for individual i makes it possible to estimate all the coefficients in equation (6), including i ν using panel data techniques, such as fixed effects or random effects. Having estimated the impact of unobservable characteristics on earnings, the gap between the SOE salary and private sector earnings becomes:
In the example, a talented private sector worker would be characterized by a 
for all i and h (8) where the sub-index h identifies the household. For example, all working members of a well-connected household could have higher earnings than suggested by their observable characteristics only, both in the public sector and out of it. In that case, h ν would be positive, reflecting the premium to connections.
As before, all the coefficients in this equation, including h ν , can be estimated using panel data techniques, such as random effects or fixed effects. Those coefficients can in turn be used to predict the earnings gap as follows:
In the example, a member of a well-connected household who works in an SOE would have a lower earnings gap than suggested by his or her individual characteristics only, because connections would allow him or her to get a good job out of the public sector.
The last model considered in this paper is based on a direct "matching" of public and private sector workers. Unlike the previous models, this one does not attempt to unveil the structure of private sector earnings. The comparison is directly between each public sector worker and one or several "similar" workers in the private sector, not between a public sector worker and a point in a regr ession line. Predicting alternative earnings based on a regression line is the same as setting the stochastic disturbance of the earnings equation equal to zero. But this assumption is not necessary with the matching model. The best match for a public sector worker is a worker who, in general, has earnings either above or below the regression line.
The only "structure" used by the matching model can be found in the mechanism that determines the sector of employment, which is still supposed to be the one described in equation (3). This equation is estimated using a Logit model, and the resulting coefficients are used to measure the "distance" D jk between an individual j who works for an SOE and an individual k who works in the private sector. This distance is defined as the square of the difference between the predicted probabilities that these two individuals would work for an SOE:
Among all the k individuals who work in the private sector, individual n is considered the best match for public sector worker i if D in < D jk for all k ≠ n. In addition, it is required that the predicted probability of working in an SOE be non-negligible, for both individual i and individual k, and that the distance D in does not exceed some critical threshold. With the matching approach, the gap in earnings is defined as:
This model can be easily extended so as to consider more than just one, best match for each SOE worker. In this paper, the average earnings of the best three matches for each SOE worker will be used as the appropriate W n .
The five models outlined in this section rely on different assumptions to estimate the earnings gap between the public and the private sector. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the sample of observations that can be used in each case is generally different too. The five R indicators are thus the joint outcome of both different assumptions and different data sets. For instance, the ordinary least squares model does not attempt to correct for the effects of the selection bias, but it uses the largest number of observations. On the other hand, the individual effects model provides a highly credible way to "remove" the effect of unobservable characteristic s, but it can only be applied to the fewer individuals whose earnings are observable at two points in time. Rather than trying to argue in favor of one or the other of the R indicators, this paper compares the results obtained with all five. This comparison is key to assess how sensitive the predicted earnings gap is to the chosen econometric technique.
Data
The data used in this paper are from the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys months. The third one is the average hourly compensation from primary occupation, which is calculated dividing the first earnings indicator by the number of hours worked in the primary occupatio n over the year. Finally, the section dealing with the robustness of the results also considers a fourth indicator, which is annual consumption per capita.
The other key variable is the sector of employment. The analysis focuses on the differences between the SOEs and the private sector, excluding government agencies.
Turnover among civil servants is low in recent years, and no substantial change in their number is foreseen in the near future. Therefore, the relevant alternative for an SOE worker is not a job as a civil servant, but rather a job in the private sector. In the empirical analysis, anyone who reported working in an SOE as his or her main employment in the past 12 months was considered an SOE worker. Those who reported working in a household enterprise, in a collective or cooperative enterprise, in a private firm or a foreign-owned company, as well as those who reported doing casual work, were considered private sector workers. Those who reported working for the government (including teachers, doctors and administrators), or for a mass organization, were excluded from the sample. 
Model Estimation
Four of the five econometric methods used in this paper involve the estimation of an earnings function for private sector workers. The results are presented in Tables 3 to 6 .
In terms of the methodology section above, the reported coefficients are the estimated values of parameters X α (in Table 3 ), 0 X γ (in Table 4 ), S δ and X δ (in Table 5 ) and S ϕ and X ϕ (in Table 6 ). The three columns in each of these tables correspond to each of the three earnings indicators used as dependent variable in the analysis. The explanatory variables include observable individual characteristics and community characteristics.
The fit of all these regressions is satisfactory by conventional standards. The sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients is consistent with results obtained in other countries. If anything, the coefficient on the number of years of education is small by international standards, but this is hardly surprising in a country in transition from central planning to a market economy.
Some of the econometric methods used in this paper involve the estimation of other relationships, not reported in Tables 3 to 6 . In particular, the switching regression model requires the simultaneous estimation of another earnings function, for SOE workers, and a participation model, explaining who is employed by an SOE and who works in the private sector. The explanatory variables of the underlying participation model include all the individual and community characteristics affecting private sector earnings. But they also include a set of additional variables, which was identified as Z i in the methodology section of the paper. Among these additional variables are household characteristics (the same ones that were listed in the third panel of Table 2 ) and the share of SOEs in total employment at the province level. This share was estimated based on the 1997-98 round of the VLSS, taking into account all workers, regardless of whether they were wage earners or not. For the matching model, a first step was to exclude from the sample those private sector workers who appeared to be "too" different from SOE workers. This was achieved by predicting the probability of being employed by an SOE for all workers, regardless of their sector of employment. Two distribution functions were then drawn for this predicted probability: one for workers whose actual job was in an SOE, and another one for workers whose actual job was in the private sector. Only the predicted probabilities which had some density in both distributions (also called the "common support") were retained. In practice, this amounted to discarding less than five percent of private sector workers.
Also, in order go ensure greater uniformity an effort was made to match workers within each geographical area. As some of the areas contained too few observations, it was necessary to combine the northern mountains and north-central coast regions, as well as the South Central Coast, Central Highlands and Mekong Delta regions. However, the Red River Delta and Southeast were left separate. For each of these regional groups, matching was done separately for rural areas, small and medium areas, and the two biggest cities. Pairs of observations separated by a distance of 0.02 or more were dropped. Likewise, any case which had less than 3 matches was also dropped.
Predicted Earnings Gaps
The distribution of the individual earnings gaps estimated with each of the five models is summarized in Tables 7 to 9 . Each of these tables corresponds to one of the earnings indicators considered. The bottom portion of the tables reports basic statistics on the estimated earnings gaps, considered one at a time. The top portion reports correlatio n coefficients between pairs of estimated earnings gaps. Several conclusions emerge from these tables.
First, it appears that workers whose main occupation is in an SOE have substantially higher annual earnings in their main job, and in all jobs, than if they had to move to the private sector. According to tables 7 and 8, the mean earnings gap is estimated at around 20 percent by all but one of the models that do correct for selection bias. The exception is the individual effects model, whose mean earnings gap appears to be twice as high. The mean earnings gap estimated without correcting for selection bias falls in between. A similar pattern is observed regarding the median earnings gap. It follows that a majority of SOE workers earn more than their private sector counterparts, given observable and unobservable characteristics. This first conclusion is at odds with the results obtained when using the jobs approach.
The gap in earnings in favor of SOE workers is not due to a substantially higher remuneration per hour of work, however. Table 9 But overall, based on Table 9 it is difficult to claim that hourly earnings in SOEs are dramatically out of line with the private sector. The main difference is that SOE workers get remunerated for a substantially higher number of hours, compared to their private sector counterparts.
A third conclusion is that the earnings gaps estimated using the jobs approach is not supported by any of the econometric models used in this paper. Based on Table 1 , private sector workers had salaries two to six times higher than those of SOE workers.
This ratio corresponds to earnings gaps (in logs) in the range of -0.7 to -1.8. According to Table 7 , fewer than 10 percent of SOE workers earn so much less than their private sector counterparts (the earnings gap at the tenth percentile is always higher than -0.7). In statistical terms, these workers represent the "tail" of a distribution, and their estimated earnings gaps are likely to reflect measurement error, rather than dismally low remuneration in the public sector.
A fourth, important conclusion refers to the consistency of the aggregate results obtained with the different econometric models used in this paper. This consistency is highlighted by Figures 1 to 3 Last but not least, the results obtained with different econometric models are also consistent at the individual level. In principle, the distribution of the earnings gap could be similar with all five models, but the place occupied by different SOE workers in these distributions could be dramatically different. For instance, a specific SOE worker could appear to be generously overpaid when using one model, and dismally underpaid when using a different one. The top portions of Tables 7 to 9 show that this is not the case. The correlation coefficient between individual earnings gaps estimated with any two models is always high. It exceeds 0.7 in more than half of the cases.
Robustness
The earnings gaps estimated in this paper are presumably robust, in the sense that five different econometric models and three different earnings variables were used in the process, all leading to relatively similar conclusions. However, criticism could be made that these estimates are flawed, as they are all based on self-reported earnings. The underdeclaration of earnings is a common bias of household surveys like the VLSS. This bias provides a strong rationale to use the jobs approach when estimating the earnings gap between the public and the private sector. The jobs approach rests on earnings data collected from establishments, hence much less subject to measurement error. Imagine, for instance, that workers systematically report a third of their earnings. In that case, salaries in the "best" companies in Vietnam would be only twice as high as SOE salaries, and not six times higher as Table 1 suggested.
While this criticism is potentially valid, it does not appear to be highly relevant in the case of Vietnam. Based on the VLSS, in 1998 the average annual compensation of an SOE worker in his or her occupation was 8,728 thousand dong. On the other hand, an enterprise survey carried out in 2000 reported an average compensation of 10,270 thousand dong per SOE worker (Belser and Rama, 2001 , Table 2 ). This latter figure being based on firm-level records, it is similar in nature to the information the jobs approach would use. But is it really higher than the one resulting from the VLSS?
Between 1998 and 2000 the Vietnamese economy grew at an average rate of roughly five percent per year. If the growth rates of salaries were similar, 8,728 thousand dong in 1998 would become 9,623 thousand dong in 2000. Moreover, the enterprises considered in the above-mentioned survey were large, and it is common for large enterprises to pay higher wages. Taking into account wage inflation and this size bias, SOE wages do not appear to be under-estimated by the VLSS.
A related concern has to do with the different extent of under-reporting in the public and the private sectors of the economy. Maybe SOE salaries are not underreported, but the more variable and less well documented earnings of private sector workers are. Systematic under-reporting of private sector earnings would lead to overestimate the earnings gap, and possibly support the conclusion that SOE workers are overpaid, even when this were not true.
One way to address this concern is to estimate consumption gaps, instead of earnings gaps. Surveys like the VLSS have a very detailed consumption module.
Respondents are asked in great detail about which items they purchase, how frequently, and at which cost. Such a detailed measurement of consumption is deemed necessary for poverty assessments. But in the present context it can be used to verify whether SOE workers have a higher level of consumption per capita than their private sector counterparts (as the results in the previous sections show) or a lower level (as the jobs approach suggests).
All but one of the econometric models were therefore re-estimated using consumption per capita, instead of earnings, as the dependent variable. The consumption figures were constructed by adding up rice, other food, non-food expenditures (including health and education), depreciation of durable goods and the rental price of housing, using a methodology that is standard in poverty assessments. These values were deflated by rice, other food, and non-food prices, for each region and each month of the year. The resulting total was divided by household size. Because consumption per capita is affected by the size and age composition of a household, as well as by its accumulated assets, additional explanatory variables were needed when re-estimating the models. Those variables are the ones listed in the third data panel in Table 2 . Household effects is the one model that could not be re-estimated. This is because, by construction, all of the adult members of a household have the same consumption level. In the absence of variation in the dependent variable within the household, differences in the observable characteristics of its members (including the sector they work in) would appear to have no consequences.
The estimated consumption gaps are summarized in Table 10 . It appears that the consumption per capita of SOE workers would decline by roughly twenty percent if they were to move to the private sector. Only one model (the last one) yields a smaller gap, but it still shows that most SOE workers would be worse off if they had to relinquish their jobs. As before, the correlation between gaps estimated with any two models is high.
Conclusion
The workers approach provides reliable estimates of the earnings gap between public and private sector jobs, even in a country where recruitment into the public sector, and separations from it, are strongly influenced by individual characteristics that are not If anything, the results in this paper underestimate the extent to which SOE workers are overpaid, because it focuses on measurable earnings and benefits only. Some of the most valuable benefits associated with public sector jobs are very difficult to quantify. They include higher job security, a more generous old-age pension regime, more flexibility, and lower effort levels, among others. None of these benefits was included in the earnings variables used in the analysis. In developing countries, only the "best" private sector jobs offer similar benefits. If SOE workers were to move to the private sector, they would therefore experience a larger loss than measured by the earnings gap only. Studies done for other countries estimate the value of the loss in intangible benefits at 20 to 50 percent of the SOE salary (see Assaad, 1999, and Chong and Rama, 2001 ).
The conclusion that SOE workers are substantially overpaid is at odds with the one obtained when using the jobs approach. The latter suggested that SOE workers could earn salaries two to six times higher in the private sector. Admittedly, one could argue about the most accurate econometric model to estimate the earnings gap when using the workers approach. It is also regrettable that some of the estimates of the average earnings gap differ by as much as twenty percentage points. But the range of variation resulting from the workers approach, depending on the model used, is negligible compared to the magnitude of the mistakes the jobs approach would lead to. Governments, and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, would be ill-advised to recommend pay raises in the public sector based on the jobs approach. The results in this paper show that even a crude version of the workers approach, not correcting the estimated earnings gaps for selection bias, would yield more reliable results.
Of course, it would be inappropriate to conclude that public sector workers are always overpaid. The results in this paper refer to a specific group of public sector workers in a specific country at a specific point in time. The results may not even apply to government employees in Vietnam. In fact, the most important message of this paper refers to the methodology it proposes, not to the results it obtains. This methodology could be easily replicated for other public sector workers, especially in the context of public sector reform. In the case of Vietnam, government administration will be subject to an ambitious reform program over the next ten years. According to this program, "fundamental reforms will be undertaken with regard to the salary of cadres and civil servants, so that these will become the main driving force for the public administration system and be adequate to maintain their life and the life of their families" (Government of Vietnam, 2001, p. 10, official translation) . Basing those fundamental reforms on the workers approach, rather than the jobs approach, would be advisable.
In finishing, it is worth making one last point on methodology. All of the models used in this paper are based on a hypothetical comparison of earnings in and out of the public sector. Experimentation would be a much more reliable method to estimate the earnings gap. If SOE workers could be fired, their subsequent earnings would provide an unbiased measure of the extent to which they were underpaid or overpaid in the public sector. Needless to say, running such an experiment would be inadmissible on moral grounds. But the reform program of Vietnam, aimed at modernizing the state sector, will mimic it in practice.
Over the next few years several hundred thousand SOE workers may lose their jobs as their enterprises change ownership, are restructured or go bankrupt. Most of the job separations will be voluntary, but for some workers there will be no choice (for instance, in the context of liquidation). Earnings gaps estimated along the lines proposed in this paper have been used to design an appropriate compensation package (World Bank, 2001) . It is precisely because SOE workers are overpaid that the package needs to be generous. Indeed, there would be no need for compensation if separated workers could earn two to six times higher salaries after separation, as the jobs approach indicates. But information on the exact extent of the subsequent loss in earnings can be used to finetune the compensation package. And this information can also be used to assess which of the five models considered in this paper produced more accurate (or less inaccurate)
predictions. Such an assessment is the natural follow up of this research. Source: Authors' calculations. Refers to all workers in households with at least two wage earners. Estimated on data from the 1997-98 VLSS, using fixed effects at the household level. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by one, two and three asterisks, respectively. 
